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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

1

Plaintiff-Appellee,

\\

V.

1

ROBERT T. HASTON,

\\

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 900021-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURSIDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of attempted second
degree murder, a second degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. §§
76-4-101, 76-4-102(2) and 76-5-203 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court properly instruct the jury as to
what constitutes a reasonable doubt?

It is the exclusive

function of the trial court to instruct the jury on relevant law;
and no prejudicial error occurred if it appears that the giving
or rejection of a requested instruction would not have affected
the outcome of the trial.

State v. McCumberf 622 P.2d 353 # 359

(Utah 1985).
Did the trial court properly limit defendant's proposed
depraved indifference instruction?

The same standard as stated

in the preceding paragraph governs this issue.

Were the prosecutor's remarks concerning the law
prejudicial error?

In assessing whether remarks merit reversal

in a criminal case this Court will determine if the remark called
to the jurors' attention matters which they would not be
justified in considering in determining their verdict, and
whether the jurors probably were influenced by the remarks.
State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Did the trial court err in imposing firearm enhancement
terms and restitution.

The standard of reviewing enhancement

provisions is set forth in State v. Willett, 694 P.2d 601, 603
(Utah 1984), which limits enhancement terms to five years.

It is

within the discretion of the trial court to impose sentence and
restitution.

State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417 (Utah 1987).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-203(2) (1990):
A person who has been convicted of a
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as follows:
(2) In the case of a felony of the
second degree, for a term at not less than
one year nor more than 15 years but if the
trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile
or the representation of a firearm was used
in the commission or furtherance of a felony,
the court shall additionally sentence the
person convicted for a term of one year to
run consecutively and not concurrently; and
the court may additionally sentence the
person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively
and not concurrently.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201(3)(a)(i), (b), (c):
(3)(a)(1) When a person is adjudged guilty
of criminal activity which has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other
sentence it may impose, the court shall order
that the defendant make restitution up to
-2-

double the amount of pecuniary damages to the
victim or victims of the offense of which the
defendant has pleaded guilty, is convicted,
or to the victim of any other criminal
conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court unless the court in applying
the criteria in Subsection (3)(b) finds that
restitution is inappropriate. Whether the
court determines that restitution is
appropriate or inappropriate, the court shall
make the reasons for the decision a part of
the court record.
(b) In determining whether or not to
order restitution, or restitution which is
complete, partial, or nominal, the court
shall take into account:
(i) the financial resources of the
defendant and the burden that payment"of
restitution will impose, with regard to the
other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant
to pay restitution on an installment basis or
on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on
the defendant of the payment of restitution
and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the
court determines make restitution
inappropriate.
(c) If the defendant objects to the
imposition, amount, or distribution of the
restitution, the court shall at the time of
sentencing allow him a full hearing on the
issue.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Robert T. Haston, was charged with attempted
second degree murder, a second degree felony, under Utah Code
Ann. SS 76-5-203, 76-4-102(2) and 76-4-101 (1990).

(R. 5-6). A

jury found him guilty as charged and the trial court sentenced
him to the Utah State Prison for not less than one year nor more
than fifteen years. A firearm enhancement was added to the
sentence.

Defendant was also ordered to pay fines and

restitution.

(R. 112, 119 - 120).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the early evening of July 2, 1989, defendant shot
Leonard Tate in the chest, just below the right nipple, from a
distance of four to five feet (T. 84-86, 114, 127). The gun
defendant used was a late model, state of the art, Smith & Wesson
.357 magnum (T. 230, 232, 234). At the time of the shooting, the
gun was fully loaded with Federal Ammunition Company Hydra-Shok
ammunition, a type of ammunition heavy enough to be considered a
hunting round and designed to unload its energy upon impact to
the body it strikes and not move on (T. 184-86).

The resulting

wound caused injury to the chest, ribs, lungs, liver and
diaphragm of the victim (T. 28-29).

When the victim arrived at

the hospital he was bleeding to death, and a five to six hour
operation was necessary to save his life (T. 27-29).
After the shooting, defendant attempted to leave
Scotty's Motel, where the shooting occurred, but was physically
stopped by the motel manager and taken to the motel office until
the police arrived and took him into custody (T. 50, 58-59).
During the period of time immediately following the shooting,
defendant gave several different versions of the incident.

He

stated that the victim had grabbed the gun and when defendant
grabbed it back, it went off (T. 37-38, 166); that the victim had
accidentally shot himself (T. 53); that the shooting was an
accident (T. 154); and that the shooting was an accident, in that
he did not mean to shoot the victim (T. 164).
At trial, defendant, the victim, and David Ezzedine, an
acquaintance and eyewitness to the shooting, testified to
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spending much of the day and a half prior to the shooting
drinking and unwinding at the Se Rancho Motel (Aug. 1) and at
Scotty's Motel (Aug. 2) away from the men's shelter, where the
men were staying.

Approximately five to six cases of beer were

purchased during that period, and defendant also bought a fifth
of peppermint schnapps (T. 78, 95, 100, 207). Four other people
drank some of the beer (T. 78, 100-03, 213-14), and one of those
people also brought some vodka (T. 215).
The victim testified that at about 4:00 p.m., about two
hours before the shooting, he had been lying asleep at the motel,
heard a hammer click and looked up to find defendant pointing a
gun at his head (T. 121-22).

Earlier in the day defendant had

been carrying the gun around fully loaded, swinging it around and
popping bullets in and out.

At that time the victim had told him

to put it away before he hurt somebody (T. 120-21).

Both the

victim and Mr. Ezzeddine testified that just before the shooting
defendant and the victim had an argument about the amount of beer
left, which resulted in defendant retrieving his gun, grasping
the gun with both hands and pointing it at the victim.

When the

victim asserted that defendant did not have the nerve to shoot
him, defendant pulled the trigger (T. 84-86, 127).
Defendant gave a conflicting version of the shooting
incident, stating that he was trying to load the gun so that they
would have protection in case of a burglary when the gun slipped
and went off (T. 222). He testified that he was in a state of
shock and disbelief at the shooting, grabbed the gun and put it
in his gym bag and went to the office.

He took the gun with him

so that it would not be stolen (T. 226-27).

Defendant made no

attempt to aid the victim.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly instructed the jury as to what
constitutes a reasonable doubt.
The trial court properly limited defendant's proposed
depraved indifference instruction because its deletion of two
sentences as surplus was solidly within its discretion.
The trial court properly cured the prosecutor's
remarks, and the jurors could not have been influenced by them.
The trial court erred in imposing a six year firearm
enhancement and properly imposed restitution, a fine, surcharge
and recoupment costs.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES A REASONABLE DOUBT.
On appeal defendant offers numerous bases for finding
the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction erroneous.

He

asserts that the instruction misstated the law and permitted
improper inferences concerning the State's burden of proof (Br.
of App. at 12); that the instruction failed to adequately define
the appropriate standard (Br. of App. at 13); and that the
instruction allowed a jury to convict him on a standard of proof
below the due process protections of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments of the United States Constitution and article I,
section 7 of the Utah Constitution (Br. of App. at 13-14).

At

trial defendant objected to the instruction only on the basis of
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two recent Utah Supreme Court cases, State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d
1375 (Utah 1989), and State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah
1989).

Failure to raise issues at the trial court bars

defendant from raising the issues for the first time on appeal.
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326,.327-28 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
granted,

P.2d

252, 254 (Utah 1983).

(Utah 1989); State v. Steqqell, 660 P.2d
Therefore, the State will only address

defendant's argument based on the Ireland and Johnson cases.
While the Utah Supreme Court has expressed concern as
to the inclusion in reasonable doubt instructions of certain
terms or phrases, the Court has never mandated that particular
language be included.

Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1380; Johnson, 774

P.2d at 1147-49, (concurring opinions of Stewart, J. and
Zimmerman, J.); State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980).
Instead, the standard remains that jury instructions must be

Defendant's entire objection at trial was as follows:
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, and I did have one
other exception, and that was to Instruction
No. 7 which the Court gave on the definition
of — in part of beyond a reasonable doubt,
that standard. I also proposed an
instruction on that concept and took language
directly from the State v. Ireland and State
v. Johnson cases which are cases that came
down from the Utah Supreme Court earlier this
year. Both of those cases indicated that the
previously used or generally used reasonable
doubt instruction did not accurately state
the law, and I took language directly from
those cases which I think describes clearly
to a jury what that standard of beyond a
reasonable doubt means, and object to the
Court giving the instruction that I think was
the one that the Court itself proposed rather
than the one that I proposed.
(R. 312-13.)
-7-

construed as a whole; and, a conviction will be overturned only
if a defendant can show that he was prejudiced by the instruction
such that the outcome of the case would have likely been
different.

State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1980);

United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 1988) (no
constitutional infringement occurs where instructions as a whole
properly instructed the jury as to defendant's presumption of
innocence and the government's burden of proof).
Further, it is the exclusive province of the trial
court to instruct the jury on relevant law.
Accordingly, the judge may, over the
objection of the defendant's counsel, give
any instruction that is in proper form,
states the law correctly, and does not
prejudice the defendant. State v. Piper, 113
Ariz. 390, 393, 555 P.2d 636, 639 (1976).
However, all instructions are subject to the
general and overreaching rule that the judge
must make it clear to the jury that the
defendant has "no particular burden of proof
but [is] entitled to an acquittal if there
[is] any basis in the evidence from either
side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt
that the defendant [is] guilty of the
offense." State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695
(Utah 1 9 8 0 ) . . . .
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1980).
As noted in State v. Johnsonf jury instructions must be
construed as a whole.

Ld. at 1146.

Here, the trial court fully

and correctly instructed that defendant was entitled to a
presumption of innocence (Instruction 7; R. 86), that the State
carried the burden of proving all essential elements of the crime
(Instructions 3, 11, and 12; R. 83, 90-91, 92-93) and that the
State must prove that defendant acted with the requisite intent
(Instructions 11, 13-15, 18; R. 90-91, 94-96, 99).
-8-

Turning to the language of the reasonable doubt
instruction itself, it is equally clear that the instruction was
proper.

The trial court instructed the jury that:
All presumptions of law, independent of
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a
defendant is presumed innocent until he is
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And
in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is
entitled to an acquittal.
I have heretofore told you that the
burden is upon the State to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not
require proof to an absolute certainty. Now
by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is
based on reason and one which is reasonable
in view of all the evidence. It must be
reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a
wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond
a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof
which satisfies the mind, convinces the
understanding of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it and obviates all
reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a
doubt which reasonable men and women would
entertain, and it must arise from the
evidence or the lack of the evidence in this
case.

(Instruction No. 7; R. 86).
The first paragraph of the trial court's instruction is
identical to the first paragraph of defendant's requested
instruction.

The language is a correct and unequivocal statement

of defendant's presumption of innocence.

Ireland, 773 P.2d at

1380.
The first line of the second paragraph is again
identical to defendant's requested instruction and merely
restates, again unequivocally, that the State has the burden of
proof.
o_

The second sentence, "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt
does not require proof to an absolute certainty," must be read
with the fourth sentence, "It must be a reasonable doubt and not
a doubt which is merely fanciful or imaginary or based on wholly
speculative possibility."

Together, the language establishes, as

recognized by the Utah Supreme Court, that "a fanciful or wholly
speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof beyond a
reasonable doubt."

Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1149 (Stewart, J.,

concurring in the result).

The language is not the same as the

"possible or imaginary" language disapproved of by the Court in
Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1380, but was altered to comply with the
case law.
The third sentence of the second paragraph, "Now by
reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is based on reason and one
which is reasonable in view of all the evidence," is identical to
language used and approved of in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,
572 (Utah 1987).

Although defendant objects to that instruction

as "circular," (Br. of App. at 16), it is identical to the
instruction defendant herself offered.

(See Defendant's

Requested Instruction paragraph 2; R. 71-72).

Defendant has no

basis to object to its inclusion.
The first part of the fifth sentence, "Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the
mind, convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it. . .," is identical to that approved of
in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d at 572-572, and favorably reviewed
in State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1145-1146.
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The second part of

the sentence, "and obviates all reasonable doubt," is in
conformity with Justice Stewart's requirement that -the
instruction should specifically state the State's proof must
obviate all reasonable doubt•"

Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381

(Stewart, J., dissenting).
The last sentence of the instruction, MA reasonable
doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain,
and it must arise from the evidence or the lack of the evidence
in the case," has been approved of in both Tillman, 750 P.2d at
572-573, and Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1145-46. Again, it is
identical to the language requested by defendant.

(See

Defendant's Requested Instruction, paragraph 2; R. 71-72).
Taken as a whole, it is clear that the trial court's
instructions to the jury retained the burden of proof on the
State to prove all elements of the charge beyond a reasonable
doubt.

The reasonable doubt instruction contained no erroneous

language and properly stated the law.

Since the jury was

properly instructed, defendant was not entitled to an instruction
which was merely redundant or repetitive of the court's.
Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1146 (quoting State v. Wilks, 25 Utah 2d 22,
25, 474 P.2d 733, 735 (1970)).

Even if the court's instruction

required more appropriate language, 6uch error would be harmless
in light of the totality of the jury instructions and ample
evidence against defendant.

Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1146; State v.

Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-920 (Utah 1987).

-ii-

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY LIMITED DEFENDANT'S
PROPOSED DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE STANDARD.
At trial the following "depraved indifferenceH
instruction (Instruction 13) was given to the jury:
Depraved indifference refers not to mental
subjective state but to the objective
circumstances under which the conduct causing
the injury occurred. Reckless conduct which
has an incidental tragic result will not
suffice. At the time of the act, the
defendant must know of the risk. Knowledge
here refers to the nature of the conduct or
the circumstances surrounding it or both, but
not the result produced by the conduct. The
circumstances of the injury when objectively
viewed must evidence a depraved indifference
to human life.
(Instruction 13; R. 94).
In giving that instruction the trial court modified
defendant's proposed instruction by deleting the following two
sentences:
In other words, there must be a knowing doing
of an uncalled for act in callous disregard
of its likely harmful effect which is so
heinous as to be equivalent to a "specific
intent" to kill. Examples of this might be
unmitigated wickedness, extreme inhumanity or
acts of a high degree of wantonness.
(R. 78). The court reasoned "that the instruction as modified
provided the essential elements insofar as the definition of
depraved indifference is concerned, that the 'in other words'
language or clause which was stricken by the court was . . .
surplusage . . . ."

(T. 312.)

Defendant's sole objection at trial was that the
sentences deleted from Instruction 13 complied with the
directives given by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Bolsinqer,
-12-

699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), and gave the jury the knowledge needed
to evaluate a depraved indifference state of mind (R. 311). On
appeal defendant attacks as "vague" both Instruction 13 and
Instruction 11, which set forth the statutory elements of
attempted second degree murder.

He asks this Court to evaluate

each instruction line by line to determine whether they, when
read in concert, satisfy the standard for a depraved indifference
instruction articulated in State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254
(Utah 1988).

No objection to the adequacy of Instruction 11 was

made below; therefore, it should not be part of this Court's
consideration now.

State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah

1987) ("The usual rule is that '[n]o party may assign as error
any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects
thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the
matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection.'H
(quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)); State v. John, 770 P.2d 994,
995 (Utah 1989).
The only matter before this Court is whether the trial
court erred in deleting the last two sentences of Instruction 13
as surplusage.

Defendant himself acknowledges that the sentences

in question are "explanatory portions" of the instruction (Br. of
App. at 25). The first phrase of each sentence, "in other words"
and "examples of this might be," indicate that they were meant to
be parenthetical and illustrative of the definition previously
stated.

The remainder of the first sentence is taken directly

from dicta in Bolsinger, 699 P.2d at 1220. The phrase that there
"must be a knowing doing of an uncalled-for act" is a restatement

-13-

of two prior sentences of the given instruction "At the time, the
defendant roust know of the risk.

Knowledge here refers to the

nature of the conduct or the circumstances or both • • . •"

The

first phrase, "in callous disregard of its likely harmful effect
which is so heinous as to be equivalent to a 'specific intent' to
killing" may be misleading in light of current Utah law.

The

Utah Supreme Court observed in State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39, 43
(Utah 1987), "[t]he terms 'general intent' and 'specific intent'
are no longer used in our present criminal code which refers to
'culpable mental states,'" thus seemingly rejecting use of those
terms as inapplicable to the current criminal code. Although the
phrase in question was quoted with approval in Bolsinqer and
Standiford, the Court did not incorporate an "equivalent to a
'specific intent' to kill" standard in its suggestions concerning
a depraved indifference jury instruction.

In Standiford, the

Court stated, in pertinent part, that the jury should be
instructed that it must find "that the conduct [of defendant]
evidenced an utter callousness and indifference toward human
life."

Ici. at 264. Although defendant equates the Court's

charge there with his proposed instruction (Br. of App. at 28),
in fact, the suggested instruction falls far short of the
"equivalent to a 'specific intent' to kill" standard defendant
urges.

Therefore, that language was properly excluded by the

trial court.
The second sentence of defendant's proposed
instruction, "[ejxamples of this might be unmitigated wickedness,
extreme inhumanity or acts of a high degree of wantonness," is a
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highly subjective litany of general evils and adds nothing of
substance.

Its inclusion would not have assisted the jury in

defining or applying a depraved indifference standard.
Defendant further argues that the evidence fails to
support a finding of "depraved indifference." (Br. of App. at
30).

On appeal, this Court will view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the jury's verdict.

State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d

422, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345
(Utah 1985).

A verdict is reversed "only when the evidence is so

lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not have
reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt."

State v. Walker,

743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987).
In the instant case, the jury returned a general
verdict finding defendant guilty of attempted second degree
murder (R. 112). The jury had three variations by which to find
defendant guilty:

1) that defendant attempted to unlawfully

cause the death of the victim, and that such attempt was made
either intentionally or knowingly; 2) that defendant
intentionally attempted to cause serious bodily injury to the
victim by committing an act clearly dangerous to human life which
could have caused his death; or 3) that defendant, acting under
circumstances evidencing depraved indifference to life, engaged
in conduct which created a grave risk of death to defendant or
which could have caused his death.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203

(1990) (R. 90). Here, the evidence of defendant's guilt was
overwhelming.

The jury could have convicted him on any of the

possible variations of the charge.
evidence will so demonstrate.
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A brief review of the

Defendant shot the victim straight through the torso
from a distance of less than five feet using ammunition which
qualified as a hunting round and was designed to unload maximum
kinetic energy on impact and thereby inflict maximum damage on
its target (T. 114, 125, 184-87).

The gun used to shoot the

victim was an expensive, top-of-the-line Smith & Wesson, in near
new condition and could not be accidentally discharged (T. 184,
188).

Both the victim and another eyewitness to the shooting,

David Ezzeddine, testified unequivocally that defendant, after a
brief argument with the victim, gripped the gun with both hands,
stretched his arms out, raised the gun, pointed it at the
victim's chest, pulled the hammer back, looked straight at the
victim and shot (T. 82-84, 126, 145-46).

Mr. Ezzeddine said

defendant's eyes looked "cold" and "eerie" (T. 85). Another
witness who saw defendant within several minutes of the shooting
testified that defendant was nonchalant and exhibited no remorse
over the shooting (T. 69). Defendant himself, though stating
that he was extremely intoxicated at the time he shot the weapon,
was able to remember many details of the day, including what he
had done and conversations he had had with numerous people (T.
216-21).

He also testified to the care he purportedly had taken

to check the gun's cylinder and action to make sure it was empty
and safe before showing it to Mr. Ezzeddine and the victim
shortly before the shooting (T. 221). He was able to remember
that his concern for Mr. Ezzeddine and Mr. Ezzeddinefs fear of
being robbed, a fear which Mr. Ezzeddine did not admit to in his
testimony, prompted him to take the ammunition from his watch
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pocket# load the cylinder, switch the gun to his left hand, and
check the action (T. 222). However, he could not remember where
the victim was or even how he himself had been sitting on the bed
(T. 222). His testimony was conveniently vague when it came to
the event of the shooting, was self-serving and incredible.
After the shooting defendant had the presence of mind to try to
cover himself, giving police officers several different accounts
of what happened (T. 37-38, 53, 154, 164-66).

The only

consistency in his explanation was his assertion that he was not
responsible for the shooting.

The jury only deliberated an hour

and a quarter before finding him guilty (R. 117).
In light of the ample evidence against defendant, the
jury could have found that defendant knowingly or intentionally
attempted to kill the victim or that defendant intentionally
attempted to cause serious bodily injury to the victim by
committing an act clearly dangerous to human life.

That being

the case, there necessarily would be sufficient evidence that
defendant was guilty of depraved indifference murder, and "[a]ny
error in the instructions was harmless."
264.

Standiford, 769 P.2d at

See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048-49 (Utah 1984);

State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162, 168-69 (Utah 1987).

The jury's

verdict should be affirmed.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CURED THE
PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS, AND THE JURORS COULD
NOT HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY THEM.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor misstated the law
in his closing argument and that the trial court failed to cure

the error because the jury instructions, to which the jury was
referred, were misleading.
In assessing whether remarks made by counsel were so
objectionable as to merit reversal in a criminal case, this Court
will apply the following test:
(1) Did the remarks call to the
attention of the jurors matters which they
would not be justified in considering in
determining their verdict; and (2) were the
jurors, under the circumstances of the
particular case, probably influenced by the
remarks?
State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing
State v, Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 1989); State v. Troy,
688 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Utah 1984); State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54,
513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973)).
The prosecution's statement, the defense's objection
and the trial court's response are as follows:
MR. COPE:

[prosecutor]
. . .

There are three ways that . . .
[justice] can be achieved. The State has
offered you each and every one of the three.
The State suggests that you may find . . .
[defendant] guilty each of the three ways,
but any of the three ways is sufficient to
find him guilty. When you read the
Instructions, you will note that voluntary
intoxication, Instruction 20, does not apply
at all to the third way [depraved
indifference] that the government suggests
that this may be found guilty. Doesn't
matter how drunk he was. Doesn't matter how
drunk people were that he shot.
MS. REMAL: [defense attorney] Your Honor, I
have to object. I think that that misstates
the law.
MR. COPE: I think it's a fair comment on the
evidence and also upon the law and the
instruction, your Honor.
-18-

THE COURT: Well, Counsel, I'm going to
advise the jury that they've been given the
law by this court. They can look at those
instructions and interpret them themselves as
to what it means, and if counsel, as I've
stated previously, misstates that law or
facts to you, you must rely on your own
judgment.
MR. COPE: Fair enough. You decide what
Instruction 20 means. You decide what
applicability it has. That's your job.
(T. 302-03).
In applying the first prong of the Lopez test, this
Court must determine whether the prosecutor's statement
concerning the effect of voluntary intoxication on the element of
depraved indifference was a misstatement of the law.

Although

defendant states that "voluntary intoxication i^ a defense to
second degree murder" (Br. of App. at 35), a correct reading of
the applicable authorities indicates that voluntary intoxication
"may beM a defense to that charge.

Standiford, 767 P.2d at 265.

In order to utilize voluntary intoxication as a defense, a jury
must determine that the degree of intoxication is so great as to
negate the existence of the necessary mental state.

See State v.

Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 89-90 (Utah), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988
(1982) ("[F]or . . . [defendant] to have been successful, he had
to prove much more than he had been drinking.

It was necessary

to show that his mind had been affected to such an extent that he
did not have the capacity to form the requisite . . . intent or
purpose . • . . " ) .

Although the trial court declined to rule on

whether the prosecutor misstated the law, (T. 318) the State now
concedes that voluntary intoxication may be a defense to a
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depraved indifference element and that the prosecutor's statement
to the contrary was error, thus satisfying the first prong of the
Lopez test.
However, in applying the second prong of the Lopez
test, it is not possible that the jurors could have been
influenced significantly by the remarks, so the remarks did not
constitute reversible error.
they did.

Defendant does not even allege that

First, defendant's counsel immediately objected to the

prosecution's statement.

Lopez, 789 P.2d at 45.

The trial court

responded appropriately that it had instructed the jury on the
law and that it should look to the instruction and interpret the
law (T. 303). Specifically, the jury was directed that the trial
judge would instruct them on the law applicable to the case
(Instruction 5, R. 84). It was given the elements of the crime
of attempted second degree murder (Instruction 11, R. 90-1) and
was instructed that if the evidence failed to establish elements
of that charge, the jury could consider a lesser included
offense. Ici. It was given the elements of the lesser included
offense.

(Instruction 12, R. 92-3).

It was instructed on the

definition of depraved indifference (Instruction 13, R. 94) and
as to the definition of voluntary intoxication and the degree of
defendant's burden in asserting that defense (Instructions 20,
21; R. 101, 102).
Second, proof of defendant's guilt was extremely
strong, and thus the prosecutor's remark will not be presumed
prejudicial.

Lopez, 789 P.2d at 45.

under Point II, supra).

(See review of evidence,

No reasonable likelihood exists that the

jurors were affected by the prosecutor's comments.
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Id.

Finally, defendant has not utilized the Lopez standard
for assessing a prosecutor's comments but instead has chosen to
attack jury Instructions 20 and 21 as being misleading and
improper•

However, defendant cannot avail himself of that

argument.

He did not timely object to Instruction 20 at trial

and is thereby barred from raising that issue on appeal. Medina,
738 P.2d at 1023.

Instruction 21 is defendant's own instruction,

given verbatim as he requested it (R. 77). He cannot now object
to his own statement of the law.

To do so is inviting error, and

defendant cannot take such advantage.
123, 252 P. 677, 679 (1927).

Straka v. Voyles, 69 Utah

See also Mann v. Fairbourn, 12 Utah

2d 342, 345-46, 366 P.2d 603, 608 (1961); Nelson v. Lott, 81 Utah
265, 273-74, 17 P.2d 272, 276 (1932).
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING A SIX-YEAR
FIREARM ENHANCEMENT AND PROPERLY IMPOSED
RESTITUTION, A FINE, SURCHARGE AND RECOUPMENT
COSTS.
A.

The Trial Court Could Properly Impose A Maximum
Term Of Only Five Years For Use Of A Firearm.

The trial court, in sentencing defendant, imposed
enhancement terms of one-year and zero to five years, to be
served consecutively with defendant's one to fifteen year term
(R. 119-20).

Defendant argues that the cumulative six-year

enhancement term exceeds the maximum allowable enhancement term
of five years.

The State concedes that the trial court

erroneously imposed a six-year enhancement term.
In State v. Willet, 694 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1984), the
Utah Supreme Court interpreted the firearm enhancement statute to
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provide a maximum enhancement term of five years.

See also State

v, Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The State,
therefore, requests this Court to affirm defendant's conviction
and remand the case to the trial court with the instruction to
impose an enhancement term of five years.
B.

The Trial Court Properly Imposed Restitution.

Defendant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering him to pay restitution in the amount of
$64,098.62.

In so ordering, the trial court stated:

I will direct that Mr. Haston pay
restitution in the amount set forth of
$64,098.62. I am of the view that to order
otherwise would be viewed as, and could be
viewed as, some sort of condonation of the
conduct of Mr. Haston causing the serious,
grievous bodily injury to the victim of this
crime. It's a miracle that he didn't die as
a result of the crime that was committed here
and the wounds that he suffered at Mr.
Haston's hands. That jury did not believe
the story that it was accidental, nor does
the Court believe that it was accidental.
(T. 323.)
I have, for purposes of the record,
considered the appropriateness of the
restitution and the factors set forth in 763201. [sic] It is my view that Mr. Haston
does receive funds with which the restitution
and other fines that I have imposed could be
paid upon, and may well make substantial
inroads into that obligation that Mr. Haston
has created for the taxpayers of this state,
as well as the victim of the crime.
(T. 324.)
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201 (1990):
[T]he Court shall order that the defendant
make restitution to the victim or victims of
the offense of which the defendant . . . is
convicted . . . unless the court in applying
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the criteria in section 3(b) of this chapter,
finds that restitution is inappropriate. If
the Court determines that restitution is
appropriate or inappropriate, the Court shall
make the reasons or the decision a part of
the court record.
(Emphasis added.)

Section 3(b) reads as follows:

(b) In determining whether or not to order
restitution, or restitution which is
complete, partial, or nominal, the court
shall take into account:
(i) the financial resources of the
defendant and the burden that payment of
restitution will impose, with regard to
the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to
pay restitution on an installment basis or
on other conditions to be fixed by the
court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the
defendant of the payment of restitution
and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the
court determines make restitution in
appropriate.
It lies within the solid discretion of the trial court
to impose sentence and restitution.
417, 420 (Utah 1987).

State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d

Upon conviction of a crime which has

resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to the sentence
imposed, the trial court is statutorily mandated to order the
payment of restitution unless the court finds restitution to be
inappropriate. Ijd.

In light of the strong mandate to impose

restitution, the trial court here did not abuse its discretion in
ordering defendant to pay full restitution, and the trial court
stated its reasons for imposing restitution, as directed by
statute.

It should be noted in that respect that a trial court

is not directed by section 76-3-201(3)(a) to make specific
findings of fact supporting its decision to order restitution,
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just that it state its reasons for doing so.

In addition,

although not specifically stated by the trial court, the record
as a whole indicates that defendant, shortly before the shooting,
had had a motorcycle and a van and other belongings, all of which
he had sold (T. 234). In the three months prior to the shooting
defendant had purchased four guns (R. 248). Defendant also
received a monthly General Assistance check from the federal
government.
At defendant's sentencing he lodged no objection to the
imposition, amount or distribution as ordered and did not request
a hearing on the issue as provided by section 76-3-201(3)(c).
Prior to the trial court's imposition of the restitution,
defendant argued generally that defendant could not afford
restitution and asked that the court not impose it (T. 321-22).
However, that pre-imposition argument did not preserve the issue
for appeal, and defendant then waived his right to challenge the
order.

Snyder, 747 P.2d at 421. The trial court properly

ordered restitution.
C.

The Trial Court Properly Ordered A Fine, Surcharge
And Recoupment Fee.

Defendant argues that the court abused its discretion
in imposing a fine, surcharge and recoupment fee on defendant.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-302 (1990), a person may be
sentenced to pay a fine of up to $10,000 for a second degree
felony.

It is within the discretion of the trial court to impose

the fine.

See Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-301.5(5) (1990).
As noted previously the trial court considered

defendant's financial capabilities when ordering restitution and
-24-

found that he would be able to make substantial inroads into the
court-imposed obligation (T. 324).
The imposition of a 25% surcharge on a fine in a
criminal case is mandatory.
1990).

Utah Code Ann. S 63-63a-l (Supp.

The court may order defendant to pay costs, including

attorneys fees of counsel assigned to represent defendant.
Code Ann. SS 77-32a-l and -2 (1990).

Utah

A defendant who has been

ordered to pay costs may# at any time, petition the court that
sentenced him for remission of the payment of costs or any unpaid
portion thereof.

The court may limit all or part of the amount

due in costs or modify the method of payment if it finds that
payment of the amount due will impose undue hardship on the
defendant.

Utah Code Ann. S 77-32a-4 (1990).

Defendant has not

availed himself of this statutory remedy and should do so before
bringing the matter before this Court.

The trial court acted

properly within its discretion in imposing the fine, surcharge
and defense costs.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction and
sentence should be affirmed in all respects except for the sixyear firearm enhancement term imposed by the trial court, which
should be reduced to five years.
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